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This event marks the Silicon Flatiron Program's third major policy
conference aimed at examining the emerging regulatory regime that will
govern the telecommunications, Internet, and information technology
industries.' These industries form the backbone of what some call "the
New Economy"2 and others call the "information industries."3  From a
legal standpoint, these dynamic industries are regulated, in significant
part, by a framework embodied in the Telecommunications Act of 1996'
and the Clinton Administration's 1997 statement of Internet policy
found in its Global Framework for Electronic Commerce.' In short, this
framework encourages technological convergence, competition, and
minimal public regulation of the Internet--with the notable exception of
providing strong intellectual property protection.
Associate Professor of Law and Telecommunications and Executive Director of the
Silicon Flatirons Telecommunications Program, University of Colorado. Thanks to Stacey
Dogan, Dale Hatfield, Jon Nuechterlein, Adam Peters, Heidi Wald, and Bekah Warfield for
helpful comments and encouragement as well as to Evan Rothstein for first rate research
assistance and Jane Thompson for excellent library assistance.
1. For those interested in my overviews and synopses of the themes of the first two
conferences, see Phil Weiser, Paradigm Changes In Telecommunications Regulation, 71 U.
COLO. L. REV. 819 (2000) [hereinafter Weiser, Paradigm Changes]; Philip J. Weiser, Law
and Information Platforms, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1 (2002) [hereinafter
Weiser, Information Platforms].
2. See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust In The New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925,
925 (2001i (defining New Economy as computer software, Internet-related, and
telecommunications equipment and service providers).
3. This is actually my preferred term as well as its corollary, information law.
4. Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Star. 56 (1996) (codified in various sections of 15, 18, and
47 U.S.C.).
5. See PRESIDENT'S AND VICE-PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON GLOBAL ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE, A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT WEB, at http://www.itmweb.com/essay541.htm (July 1,
1997).
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This conference focuses on four possible regulatory strategies that
policymakers can employ to govern the information industries. First, a
federal agency, like the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) or
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), can adopt command and control
regulations that govern an industry. Second, a regulatory framework can
embrace a dual jurisdictional approach, where related federal and state
agencies (or courts) work in partnership-under a cooperative federalism
model-or with various degrees of tension. Third, a regime can rely on
common law-type development by judges, as is the case with
constitutional law, antitrust law, and copyright law. Finally, government
can allow codes of conduct or standard setting bodies to self-regulate an
industry. More often than not, policymakers and academics do not think
systematically about which strategy (or strategies) to use for particular
problems, leading both to legal uncertainty and inconsistency across the
different areas of the law governing the information industries.
Consequently, it is important that we move toward a coherent body of
"information law."6
The considerable ambiguity and legal uncertainty in this area is
exactly what makes information law a fruitful area for-legal academics
and practicing lawyers, both of whom must strive to develop and apply
old principles to fast changing markets.7 To provide some structure for
thinking about this area, I will first outline a "layered model" for
understanding the information industries. With that model on the table,
I then discuss some cutting edge issues in information law and how those
issues relate to the importance of thinking carefully about deploying the
regulatory strategies outlined above.
6. This effort would harmonize the tension that exists between the relevant legal
regimes. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, The Imperative ofHarmonization Between Antitrust and
Regulation, 698 PLI/PAT 73 (2002).
7. As business persons emphasize and policymakers recognize, legal uncertainty can
impede investment and the development of sound business strategies. See, e.g., Competition
Issues In The Telecommunications Industrw: Before The Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 3 (Jan. 14, 2003) (statement of Kathleen Abernathy,
Commissioner, F.C.C.) ("It is no exaggeration to say that a company may prefer receiving an
adverse ruling to having no rules at all; in the former case, the company can adjust its business
strategy and move on consistent with the regulatory parameters, while in the latter the result is
often paralysis."), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-
230241A3.doc. For a discussion of the strategies to reduce legal uncertainty and move more
effectively to a next generation regulatory regime, see Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Incentives to
Speak Honestly About Incentives: The Need for Structural Reform of the Local Competition
Debate, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 399 (2003).
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I. THE LAYERS OF THE INFORMATION INDUSTRIES
As an analytical structure for understanding the information
industries and how they are regulated, one can focus on four related
"layers." Building from bottom to top, these are: the physical layer, the
logical layer, the applications layer, and the content layer.8 I will outline
each in turn, noting how they are currently regulated.
The bottom layer is the physical layer. With technological
convergence, we live in a world where cable companies provide telephone
service; telephone companies provide Internet access; and Internet
companies carry voice calls. These developments mean that regulations
focused on the physical transport layer--whether the particular medium
is a cable broadband facility, a telephone line, or a wireless connection-
can be analyzed by the same competition policy framework. Any such
framework will invariably focus on whether the facility is being deployed
widely, whether subsidies are warranted to facilitate deployment or
adoption, whether complementors and competitors to the facility are
allowed appropriate access, and how access is priced (either for wholesale
or retail customers). In the main, each of these questions tend to be
analyzed by regulatory agencies. Increasingly, judges appreciate the
technical expertise possessed by and complex policy judgments made by
these agencies and realize that second-guessing their decisions is beyond
their expertise. 9 Thus, debates over institutional competence in this area
more often focus on whether state or federal agencies should take the
lead role rather than whether judges or regulators should be in control.
In the case of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the federal-state
jurisdictional debate is very much alive, as both regulators and courts are
still struggling to develop a sensible vision for allocating federal versus
state authority under the Act's pro-competitive vision.10
8. Kevin Werbach describes this as the four layer model of the Internet, see Kevin
Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 37,
59-65 (2002), but it is possible to apply the model more broadly to the set of information
industries which are all affected by the Internet.
9. The Supreme Court acknowledged this point in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, which limited the scope of judicial review of agency decisions.
See 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative
Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1715-17
(2001) [hereinafter, Weiser, Federal Common Law]3 (explaining significance of this aspect of
Chevron). For this same basic reason, courts should also be wary about mandating overly
ambitious remedies in antitrust cases. See Philip J. Weiser, Goldwasser, The Telecom Act,
and Refections on Antitrust Remedies, 55 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 14-17 (2003) [hereinafter,
Weiser, Goldwasser].
10. For an example of the ongoing debate, compare BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.
v. MCImetro Access Transmission Servs., Inc., 317 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc) with
id. at 1285 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). See also Jim Chen, Subsidized Rural Telephony and the
20031
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The logical layer is the least appreciated segment of the information
industries, even though the basic standards that comprise it are crucial to
shaping the Internet. These standards are generally developed and
maintained by self-regulation, although the federal government's initial
financial support during their development gave it an important
regulatory role during the Internet's early days. The Transmission
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), which facilitates all
Internet communication, is the most significant of these standards. The
current lack of direct government involvement in this area raises a series
of important questions, including: how the TCP/IP standard will be
upgraded to allow for more Internet addresses, how the security of the
Internet's information infrastructure will be protected, and whether the
Internet's open architecture will continue to adhere to the "end-to-end
principle"" championed by its early pioneers. Suggesting that the
Internet has come to a crossroads, some Internet policy observers argue
that more government involvement is necessary to address these issues
effectively. 2
The applications layer represents the inventions that enable
consumers to use the Internet in different ways. On this definition, the
set-top box that is used for digital cable and interactive television is an
application as well as an instant messaging system, a Web browser, or a
media player. Depending on the nature of the application, it may be
comprised of software or a combination of hardware and software.
Another conception of this layer is the "digital device" layer, which
mediates between the network--i.e., the combination of the physical and
logical layer-and the viewing and usage of content. In general, the
FCC stays out of the business of regulating applications, leaving
judges---in implementing both antitrust and the intellectual property
Public Interest: A Case Study in Cooperative Federalism and Its Pitfalls, 2 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 307 (2003); Roy E. Hoffinger, "Cooperative Federalism"
Gone Wrong: The Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 2 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 375 (2003).
11. For a cogent discussion of the "end-to-end" architecture principle, see Dale Hatfield,
Preface, 8 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 1 (2000).
12. See, e.g., Zoe Baird, Governing The Internet: Engaging Government, Business, and
Nonprofits, 81 FOREIGN AFF. Nov./Dec. 2002, at 15 (arguing that "[a] reliance on markets
and self-policing has failed to adequately address the important interests of Internet users" and
that it is time for governments to play a role "on key Internet policy issues"). But see Charles
Cooper, Do Gooders Will Wreck The Internet, CNET NEWS.COM, January 3, 2003, at
http://news.com.com/2010-1071-978983.html (criticizing Baird article). Any argument for a
role for government in Internet regulation is indebted to Lawrence Lessig's discussion of the




laws-to develop the basic rules of the road. 3 Nonetheless, when there
is a "chicken and egg" problem in coordinating the rollout of devices and
network upgrades, such as in the case of digital television, the FCC
sometimes gets involved in the design of network devices and
applications. This intervention, however, requires the agency to set
technical standards for how these applications will work and is fraught
with difficulty. 4
For most users of the Internet, the content layer-and the legal
issues related to it--is familiar territory. As is increasingly appreciated,
the digital age enables all types of content-be it music, movies, emails,
or voice conversations--to be copied and spread rapidly. For the courts
and Congress, the advent of digital technology and the Internet have
spawned efforts to protect the rights of copyright holders as well as to
protect children from pornography. In terms of protecting copyright
holders, most citizens did not pay attention when Congress enacted the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA).' s In the wake of their
enactment, a series of litigants have asked federal judges-without much
success---to either interpret these enactments narrowly or invalidate
them as constitutionally infirm on the ground that they unjustifiably
limit the public domain and/or the fair use privilege. 6 In almost the
reverse of the copyright context, many citizens pushed for regulation of
pornography on the Internet, but the Supreme Court has only rarely
upheld the relevant statutory provisions as constitutional.1
7
13. To date, the Microsoft litigation reflects antitrust law's most significant role in
regulating the applications layer. See U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(holding Microsoft liable for excluding Netscape from the market), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952
(2001). For a critique of the FCC's unique foray into regulating applications by imposing a
regulatory regime over AOL/Time Warner's instant messaging system, see Philip J. Weiser,
Internet Governance, Standard Setting, and Self-Regulation, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 822 (2001)
[hereinafter Weiser, Internet Governance].
14. One promising strategy for agencies to set technical standards is to develop general
mandates that can be implemented by standard setting bodies. For a discussion of this
approach, see Weiser, Internet Governance, supra note 13.
15. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000) (DMCA); 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (CTEA).
16. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S.Ct. 769 (2003) (rejecting challenge to CTEA);
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding application of
DMCA).
17. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (invalidating Communications Decency
Act); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (remanding Child Online Protection Act for
further scrutiny); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (invalidating law
regulating child pornography created with digital technology); United States v. Am. Library
Ass'n, Inc., 123 S.Ct. 2297 (2003) (upholding the constitutionality of the Children's Internet
Protection Act (CIPA)).
2003]
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II. INFORMATION LAW CHALLENGES AND REGULATORY
RESPONSES
One strategy for regulating the information industries would be to
assign different regulatory models to the different layers outlined above.
Under this approach, the FCC could oversee the physical layer, including
the management of spectrum policy. The logical layer could remain
"unregulated," with standard setting bodies, self-regulation, and free
market competition governing its development. The applications layer
could remain the domain of antitrust and, to a lesser degree, intellectual
property law (insofar as it regulates through providing or withholding
protection)."i Finally, the content layer could be subject to congressional
enactments and the judicial interpretations of them, including judgments
on their constitutionality. The salutary aspect of this approach would be
that it might ensure that there is a tailored treatment of each layer and its
unique issues. But this approach to technology policy would also
unnecessarily limit regulatory flexibility and require a constant policing
between the boundaries of each layer.'9
The inverse model for regulating the information industries would
be to apply each model of regulation identically to all layers. This
redundant regulatory strategy would create a series of conflicts because
common law rules, for example, need to be modified to recognize the
presence of regulatory actors.2 ° Moreover, legal doctrines such as the
First Amendment standards that govern the content layer may not
automatically translate to issues related to the physical layer.
Ideally, the regulatory strategy for each layer can be crafted and
applied with sufficient nuance so that it is sensitive to the unique
characteristics of the issues arising at each layer. This sensitivity
ultimately counsels that these different strategies should be mixed and
matched to address the policy issues arising at the different layers. To
provide some context for this "mixing and matching" approach to
regulatory strategy, I outline below the cases of spectrum, network
unbundling, network neutrality, copyright, and privacy policy.
18. For a discussion of how copyright law regulates applications, see Philip J. Weiser,
The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectua Property Policjy 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534 (2003).
19. The Telecom Act's strategy of regulating different technologies under different
regimes, even where they provide similar services, raises exactly these sorts of issues. See John
T. Nakahata, Regulating Information Platforms: The Challenge of Rewriting
Communications Regulation From The Bottom Up, 1 J. ON TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L.
95, 141 (2002) (describing current telecommunications regulatory system as "an archaic
classification of communications services into regulatory pigeonholes that cannot survive").
20. This theme is developed, as to the relationship of antitrust law and regulation, in
Weiser, Goldwasser, supra note 9.
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The last century of spectrum policy followed the basic agency model
of command and control regulation contemplated by the
Communications Act of 1934. In the late 1950s, Nobel Laureate
Ronald Coase criticized this model, explaining that property rights-
presumably enforced by the FCC or common law courts--could better
manage the spectrum than command and control regulation.2 This
suggestion has inspired some critical assessments of the soundness of the
initial decision to rely on agency regulation of the spectrum 22 as well as a
number of reform proposals to move the agency towards a property rights
model.23  Moreover, in the late 1990s, some commentators suggested
that technological change could facilitate the self-regulation of access to
spectrum treated as common property.24  Finally, some commentators
have suggested that courts should mandate certain approaches to
spectrum policy as required by the First Amendment.25
Upon taking office as Chairman of the FCC, Michael Powell
initiated a re-examination of the FCC's spectrum policy, led by Peter
Tenhula and Paul Kolodzy.26 This effort promises a new regulatory
regime for regulating spectrum that will take seriously the arguments of
those advocating for both the property rights model and "commons"
approaches. Moreover, this initiative may also shift spectrum policy
towards more a reactive, common law approach--whether superintended
by courts or the FCC-as opposed to proactive, command and control
agency regulation. Finally, to minimize interference while enabling the
use of unlicensed spectrum, spectrum shared between multiple users, or
spectrum owned by others, the FCC will need to set technical standards
21. See Ronald Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & ECON. 1
(1959).
22. See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth,
the Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase ' "BigJoke ". An Essay on
Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335, 366-73 (2001).
23. See, e.g., Gregory L. Rosston & Jeffrey S. Steinberg, Using Market-Based Spectrum
Policy to Promote the Public Interest, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 87 (1997).
24. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the
Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287 (1998).
25. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity- Idle Spectrum as a First
Amendment Violation, 52 DUKE L.J. 1 (2002) (arguing that idle spectrum violates the First
Amendment); Yochai Benkler & Lawrence Lessig, Net Gains: Will Technology Make CBS
Unconstitutional?, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 14, 1998, at 12, 14 (arguing that broadcast
regulation may violate the First Amendment if "spread-spectrum technology" enables multiple,
non-interfering uses of spectrum frequencies).
26. The proceedings of the FCC's Spectrum Policy Task Force can be found at
http://www.fcc.gov/sptf. See also Michael K. Powell, Broadband Migration III: New
Directions in Wireless Policy, Remarks at the Silicon Flatirons Telecommunications Program,
University of Colorado at Boulder (Oct. 30, 2002), at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/PoweU/
2002/spmkp2l2.html.
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that will govern such arrangementsY.2  This effort, particularly if an
ambitious one, may well lead the agency to look to outside standard
setting bodies or other entities for assistance.
The Telecom Act's commitment to require the "unbundling" of the
local telephone infrastructure to facilitate entry represents an ambitious
experiment in industrial policy. Under any conceivable course of events,
a forced sharing regime, where an incumbent monopolist would
"unbundle" parts of its network for lease to its competitors, would not be
easy for regulators to superintend. Unfortunately, many business
persons, politicians, and citizens were not chastened by the difficulty in
managing a transition to a new regulatory regime. Moreover, since the
Act's passage, the FCC has yet to adopt a set of unbundling
requirements that can withstand judicial scrutiny. 8 Finally, to make
matters worse, the federal and state regulators have yet to clearly
determine how to enforce the Act's unbundling requirements.29
A number of papers in this conference grapple with the intricacies
of unbundling policy and the difficult task that the FCC undertook in its
Triennial Review, which revised the rules that govern what elements of
an incumbent provider's network must be unbundled. In terms of
unbundling policy, it is critically important that the FCC justify its
approach to unbundling by reference to innovation policy. First, an
innovation policy focus means that where innovation can be brought to
the telecommunications marketplace only through the unbundling of a
particular element, there is a compelling argument for unbundling that
element. This analysis flows from the Act's standard for unbundling,
which centers on whether access to an unbundled network element is
27. See FCC Getting More Hands-On With Technical Spectrum Rules, WCA Says,
COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Jan. 15, 2003, LEXIS, Nexis, Computing & Technology File
(explaining significance of interference rules). To explain a proposal to allow unlicensed
devices to operate in the broadcast spectrum, one of the FCC's leading engineers commented
that "[t]he FCC wants to encourage the sharing of spectrum and take advantage of it when it's
not being used, as long as there is not interference ... [but we don't want the spectrum to get]
crowded to the point where it doesn't work." Richard Shim, FCC- Open Up TV Waves To
Wireless, CNET NEWS.COM (Jan. 16, 2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1033-
981047.html (quoting Alan Scrime, Chief of the Policy and Rules Division in the FCC Office
of Engineering and Technology).
28. See, e.g., AT & T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1999); U.S.
Telecom Ass'n v. F.C.C., 290 F.3d 415, 422 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (USTA).
29. For a discussion of the Telecom Act's enforcement regime, see Weiser, Federal
Common Law, supra note 9, at 1740-1752. For a recognition of the importance of this issue,
see Competition Issues in the Telecommunications Industry.- Before the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation 12 (Jan. 14, 2003) (statement of Michael K. Powell,
Chairman, F.C.C.), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/ DOC-
230241Al.pdf ("Enforcement should be something carriers take seriously, and not merely a
cost of doing business, and one way to do this is to make sure that [the FCC is] working
together, and not at cross-purposes, with the states.").
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"necessary" for a competitor and the absence of access would "impair" its
ability to compete. 3' As the Supreme Court explained, this inquiry
requires the consideration of whether competitors can obtain these
elements-or reasonable substitutes for them--from a source other than
the incumbent provider.31 Second, an innovation policy focus means that
where a product is likely to be offered even without an unbundling
requirement-either because the incumbent will ensure that it reaches
consumers or because an alternative provider will offer it--the costs of
unbundling may well outweigh its benefits.
In addition to the substantive policy questions involved in the
debate, unbundling policy also raises a critically important question of
regulatory strategy. In particular, the question of what network elements
must be unbundled may be decided differently in different states. As
appropriately recognized by the D.C. Circuit, the FCC's reasons for
providing so little discretion to state agencies under its earlier rules were
very unconvincing.3
2
I have discussed the role of state agencies under the Act elsewhere
at length,33 so I will only comment briefly on this issue here to note the
inconsistent course taken by the FCC's Triennial Review decision. 4 On
some issues, it left the state agencies with no discretion---i.e., with
respect to the provision of the unbundling of the data portion of the loop
(or line-sharing, as it is often called)--thereby surrendering an important
regulatory tool that the Act provides. On other issues--i.e., with respect
to unbundled switching--the FCC left the state agencies with, in many
cases, a totality of the circumstances inquiry that will tax their resources
by asking them to make open-ended judgment calls. In short, the FCC's
approach to both line sharing and unbundled switches took vastly
different options to enlisting state agencies in telecommunications policy.
The better model, and the path not taken in the Triennial Review
decision, is for the FCC to leave room for state experimentation under a
dear federal framework (i.e., that identifies plausibly sensible
alternatives) and to allow states to petition for a different approach by
requesting a waiver from the FCC's policy prescription.
30. 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2) (2000). For a discussion of this issue, see Weiser, Paradigm
Changes, supra note 1 at 827-31; USTA, 290 F.3d at 418-28.
31. See Iowa Utils. Bd, 525 U.S. at 389-90.
32. USTA, 290 F.3d at 422-25..
33. For a discussion of the nature of the Act's cooperative federalism framework, see
Weiser, Federal Common Law, supra note 9, at 1740-43; Philip J. Weiser, Chevron,
Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications Reform, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1999).
34. Review of the Section 251 Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers,
Report and Order, CC Docket No. 01-338 (Aug. 21, 2003), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Daily-Releases/Daily-Business/2003/dbO821/FCC-03-36Al.pdf
2003]
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Over the course of the next several years, a critical issue in
broadband policy will be whether the owners of broadband networks are
required to adhere to the open standard of the Internet protocol. As
Tim Wu explains, the debate over whether Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) should be assured of the ability to resell an incumbent's broadband
connection does not go to the heart of concerns about maintaining the
Internet's open architecture.3" Thus, the critical question is not whether
government policy requires multiple ISP access to cable, telephony, or
other broadband platforms, but whether it will impose a non-
discrimination requirement on downstream content in order to preserve
the Internet as an open platform for innovation. Such a regime would
allow intra-network rules that restrict bandwidth usage and the like, but
would view as suspicious any rules that would discriminate against some
outside content or services without a legitimate business justification.36
To justify a governmental non-discrimination mandate with respect
to broadband platforms, the FCC faces two basic challenges. First, the
agency must develop a clear conceptual framework that grapples with the
question of why broadband infrastructure providers would discriminate
against upstream content that, as a complementary service, would make
their platform more valuable. " Without such a showing, a reviewing
court will, almost certainly, remand the issue back to the FCC for a more
careful evaluation.3" Second, the FCC must evaluate whether the
proposed remedy is indeed likely to address the competitive harm it is
concerned about and whether, accounting for administrative and error
costs, the prescribed remedy will do more good than harm.
If the FCC is able to craft a minimally intrusive and easily
implemented regime to ensure broadband network neutrality, it might
succeed in mirroring what most providers would do anyway and also
build in a potentially important insurance policy against discriminatory
behavior. In making this judgment, the FCC must consider whether the
marketplace incentives towards openness and the influence of standard
setting bodies would---without any FCC action--maintain the Internet
35. For a clear explanation of this point, see Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband
Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141, 147-49 (2003); see also James
Speta, A Common Carrier Approach To Internet Interconnection, 54 FED. COMM. L. J. 225
(2002).
36. Wu, supra note 35, at 165-70; see also Philip J. Weiser, Toward A Next Generation
Regulatory Regime, 49 LOY. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
37. This issue is taken up in Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical
Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence ofAntitrust and Regulation
In The Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2003), available at
http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/cpc/CPC02-035 (last visited Sept. 24, 2003).
38. See, e.g., USTA, 290 F.3d at 422 (overruling, for lack of a reasoned justification, the
FCC's rules on local telephone network unbundling).
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as an open platform. If the FCC addresses this issue effectively in its
broadband rulemakings, it may well adopt rules that are as enduring and
important as the Computer Inquiry rules that they appear ready to
modify (or replace entirely).39
Copyright policy provides an illustrative example of how the
common law model of regulation can work. Like antitrust rules, the
history of copyright policy largely reflects a reliance on judge made rules
through common law adjudication.40 After new technologies, such. as
player pianos and VCRs, were invented, the federal courts and ultimately
the Supreme Court evaluated whether these inventions should be banned
on the ground that they facilitated unlawful infringement.4 In rejecting
these arguments, the courts allowed these technologies to develop, and
ultimately left room for Congress, with the benefit of experience with the
judicially devised approaches, to institute a new regulatory regime.42 For
both copyright and antitrust policy--as well as constitutional law--it is
very clear that Congress appreciates that the courts possess an
impartiality that confers upon them an institutional competence for
deciding certain types of questions.43 Moreover, common law courts
react to developments in the marketplace and decide matters as they
arise; agencies, by contrast, generally adopt rules that structure the
marketplace proactively. In situations involving new technologies, the
common law approach provides more flexibility and thus will often be
superior.
Contrasted with the historic tradition outlined above, there are two
notable trends in copyright policy. First, Congress is increasingly
accepting and acting on the arguments of industry related to the threats
39. See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 37, at 44-49 (discussing the FCC's Computer
Inquiries).
40. As Judge Boudin put it, "the heart of copyright doctrine--what may be protected and
with what limitations and exceptions--has been developed by the courts through experience
with individual cases." Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Ltd., 49 F.3d 807, 820 (1st Cir.
1995) (Boudin, J., concurring), afdbyan equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
41. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
(upholding use of VCR against copyright challenge); White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo
Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (holding that piano roll recordings did not infringe copyright in
musical compositions). As Stacey Dogan puts it, these decisions reflect a tradition of
copyright common law cases which hold that "copyright holders should almost never have veto
power over new technologies"-particularly ones that can be used for both infringing and non-
infringing purposes. Stacey L. Dogan, Code Versus The Common Law, 2 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 73, 75 (2003).
42. In response to the White-Smith case, for example, Congress ultimately enacted a
compulsory license regime. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 565-66 (1973)
(discussing White-Smith and the ensuing legislative response).
43. See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 57-
59 (2002) (describing nature of judicial impartiality).
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posed by new technologies as opposed to waiting for those technologies
to mature before taking action. In particular, Congress enacted the
CTEA and the DMCA in response to such arguments. Second, as a
result of these enactments, the federal courts are addressing significant
intellectual property policy issues in the context of constitutional scrutiny
rather than interstitial lawmaking. In Eldred v. Ashcroft, which involved
a constitutional challenge to the CTEA, the Supreme Court emphasized
that institutional competence concerns limit judicial oversight based on
constitutional principles even where the policy judgment at issue appears
"arguably unwise."' Even in Eldred, however, the Supreme Court did
not slam the constitutional oversight door shut; the Court's decision, for
example, stressed the importance of "built-in First Amendment
accommodations,"4" thereby allowing litigants to argue that the DMCA,
unlike the CTEA, fails that requirement.46
With the intense focus on the judicial battles, some commentators
fail to appreciate that the federal courts are unlikely to be the sole
battleground for the future of copyright policy. In particular, there are a
number of developments that suggest that the FCC and other actors will
play an important role in regulating content in the digital age. In an
effort to extend the DMCA's legacy of limiting digital copying, Senator
Hollings proposed that, if the relevant industries did not adopt a copy
protection standard for all digital devices, the FCC should adopt one and
impose it on the marketplace.47 Unlike during the debate over the
DMCA, the technology community is now far more vigilant about
opposing such efforts, so this measure seems unlikely to pass.48
44. Eldred, 123 S. Ct. 769, 783 (2003). This admonition follows what Chris Eisgruber
views as an important principle of constitutional law: where "strategic issues dominate moral
ones.., the case for judicial deference to legislatures is strong." Christopher L. Eisgruber,
Constitutional Self-Government and Judicial Review: A Reply To Five Critics, 37 U.S.F. L.
REV. 115, 182 (2002). See also Philip J. Weiser, Justice White and Judicial Review, 76 U.
COLO. L. REv. 1305 (2003) (arguing that Justice White's judicial practice acutely reflected
this sensitivity).
45. Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 788.
46. It is worth noting that, even where the courts ground their copyright decisions on
constitutional grounds, they can still make contingent rulings by leaving open the door for
congressional revision. See Eisgruber, supra note 44, at 203 (explaining the benefits of this
strategy, as used in the Dormant Commerce Clause cases). In Feist, however, the Court did
not take this route. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). See
Thomas Nachbar, The Quest To Keep Copyight Pure, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 33, 37-38 (2003) (criticizing this aspect of Feist).
47. Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act of 2002, S. 2048, 107th
Cong. (2002), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/SSSCACBDTPA/20020321 s2048_
cbdtpa-biU.pdf.
48. See Lisa Bowman, Tech Execs Lash Into Piracy Proposals, CNET NEWS.COM,
(Mar. 14, 2002) (noting opposition to proposal), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-
860192.html. In the wake of this proposal, a number of technology companies and
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Nonetheless, the FCC may well play an important role in this area, as
the cable and the consumer electronics industries' recent cable
compatibility agreement asks it to develop a regime to govern the nature
of permissible copying of digital content.49 On another non-judicial
front, the revision of the Uniform Commercial Code to require the
enforcement of click-through licenses, which is often painted as a threat
to fair use rights in the digital age,"° has stalled at the state level.5"
Finally, to the extent that industry consortia or standard setting bodies
shape the development of digital rights management systems, it remains
to be seen whether they take account of user concerns--be they privacy
or fair use.5
2
The final issue, and the one most open to different regulatory
strategies, is privacy policy. At present, there is no clear federal policy on
informational privacy. The FCC has adopted certain rules governing
telephone companies' use of customer information, but those will rules
will likely be tested in court. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit invalidated the
FCC's earlier ones on the ground that they failed to account for First
Amendment concerns (i.e., the right of the telephone company to speak
to its customers).5  In the absence of any Internet privacy rules, the
Federal Trade Commission has partially filled the vacuum by ensuring
that companies adhere to their advertised privacy policies.54 Similarly, a
number of state legislatures--as well as state attorneys general---have
organizations have formed the Alliance For Digital Progress to lobby against this or similar
measures. See http://www.alliancefordigitalprogress.org.
49. See Implementation of § 304 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996; Commercial
Availability of Navigation Devices; Compatibility Between Cable Systems and Consumer
Electronics Equipment, Further Notice ofProposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 518 (2003); see
also Fing Spectrum Policy Is Among Powell's Top Priorities, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY,
Jan. 13, 2003, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Communications Daily File ("Intellectual property is
Achilles heel of overall digital transition and FCC is 'groping its way through what role it can
play.'") (quoting Michael Powell, FCC Chairman).
50. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 429-40 (1999)
(criticizing movement to revise the UCC to facilitate the licensing of content).
51. See Paul Festa, States Spar Over Stalled Software Act, CNET NEWS.COM, (July 30,
2002), athttp://news.com.com/2100-lO23-947182.html.
52. For a discussion of how digital rights management regimes could be designed to
accommodate fair use, see Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights
Management, 15 HARV. J.L. &TECH. 41 (2001).
53. See U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999) (invalidating FCC rules
addressing use of customer information).
54. See Patricia Jacobus, FTC Investigates DoubleClick s Data-collection Practices,
CNET NEWS.COM, (Feb. 16, 2000), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-237007.
html?legacy=cnet.
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proceeded to develop their own initiatives to address the issue."5 Finally,
a number of self-regulatory efforts, including programs like Trustee and
BBBOnline, and standard setting ones, such as the World Wide Web
Consortium's Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P), have attempted to
address the issue.
Given the significant debate on the issue and the diverse set of
possible approaches, privacy policy may well prove to be a valuable
testing ground for other Internet policy issues. Unlike digital rights
management, network unbundling, network neutrality, or spectrum
policy, most Internet users understand threats to their privacy and have
complained in the face of sharing personal information without their
permission.5 6  Moreover, privacy is an area where state actors can
experiment with different approaches (say, as to local telephone
companies") and, depending on the nature of a federal regime, state
entities may also play a role in enforcement. Finally, given the industry's
strong self-interest in building confidence in e-commerce, this area may
also be one where standard setting solutions or other self regulatory ones
will be supported adequately and will develop quickly enough to make a
difference.
III. CONCLUSION
Because the policymaking world moves in years, not months, the
response to the Internet and information industries revolution that began
in the mid-1990s is still in its infancy. Over time, policymakers will
develop a set of regulatory strategies that will rely on some combination
of the models of regulation discussed above. At present, however, it is
not only clear that many important information law problems remain
unsolved, but also that we have not even fully developed our
understanding of howto solve them. That most certainly does not mean
we should wait to do so; it does mean that, despite our best efforts, we
are unlikely to resolve these issues the first time around. But with
experimentation and reform efforts over time, we are likely--at least if
55. A number of states, for example, have passed anti-sparn laws. For a full list of states
governing spam, see Anti-Spam Laws: State-by-State, ZDNET.COM, at
http://techupdate.zdnet.con/techupdate/stories/main/0,14179,2880726,00.html.
56. For an example of one such incident, see Lilly Settles With State, SILICON
VALLEY/SAN JOSE BUSINESS JOURNAL, (Jul. 25, 2002) (reporting on incident where email
addresses of users of Prozac were publicly released), available at http://www.bizjournals.com/
sanjose/stories/2002/07/22/daily6l.html.
57. See, e.g., In re Dissemination of Individual Customer Proprietary Network
Information, 2002 WL 257813, *4 (Ariz. C.C. Jan. 28, 2002) (regulating incumbent provider's
use of customer information).
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the past is prologue--to find our way to a relatively stable and sound
regulatory regime.
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